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Christine Kenneally’s The First Word is a review of work in the area of language 
evolution intended as an introductory overview for the general reader and, as 
such, is a valuable resource for pointers to work in progress on a wide range of 
evolutionary topics; these include primate calls, birdsong, categorical perception, 
gene research, computer simulation studies, to name a few. This is the subject of 
the second and third parts of the book. These parts contain the most valuable 
information on language evolution research. However, the first part of the book 
is devoted to interviews with Noam Chomsky, Sue Savage–Rumbaugh, Stephen 
Pinker and Paul Bloom, and Philip Lieberman. Here the stage is set for a kind of 
‘linguistics wars’ on language evolution, with Chomsky on one side of a ‘debate’ 
and just about everybody else on the other side. This is the least convincing part 
of the book, as we will see. 
 According to Kenneally, the study of the evolution of language can be 
divided into several phases — one starting in 1866, when “the Société de 
Linguistique of Paris declared a moratorium on the topic” (p.7), and another 
phase when “the official ban developed fairly seamlessly into a virtual ban” 
(p.79) which was maintained, it is claimed, until the publication of a paper by 
Pinker and Bloom around 1990 (but see below). The “virtual ban” on the study of 
evolution of language seems to be ascribed by Kenneally almost solely to 
Chomsky. Unfortunately, the historical record, which Kenneally examines 
somewhat superficially, does not bear out her claim of any “ban”, virtual or 
otherwise. 
 Kenneally reports that the “academic censorship” lasted for more than a 
century and language evolution remained a “disreputable pursuit”, until several 
conferences on the origins of language were organized in the 1970s. She neglects 
to mention that at the earliest conferences on the biological foundations of 
language during this period, Chomsky was a key participant and speaker, 
apparently in violation of his own ban. These include the interdisciplinary 
meeting on language and biology at Dedham, Massachusetts, in 1974, sponsored 
by the Royaumont Center for a Science of Man, as well as a conference on 
Ontogenetic and Phylogenetic Models of Cognitive Development in Paris in 1975, both 
organized by Massimo Piattelli–Palmarini (see also Boeckx & Grohmann 2007, in 
their editorial to the first issue of Biolinguistics). 
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 Moreover, Kenneally doesn’t mention that at one of the conferences she 
lists, Origins and Evolution of Language and Speech, organized by the New York 
Academy of Sciences in 1976, one of the participants and speakers was Noam 
Chomsky. Far from being regarded as someone out to squelch discussion of 
language evolution, one of the conference organizers, Stevan Harnad, noted in 
his introductory remarks that “the revolution of linguistics due to Noam 
Chomsky has provided a very different idea of what the nature of the ‘target’ for 
the evolutionary process might actually be”. That is to say, to attain a deep 
understanding of language evolution, one must first understand what the ‘target’ 
of evolution is (the quotes indicate that ‘target’ is not to be understood in a 
teleological sense). This was one of the reasons that Eric Lenneberg (1967) chose 
to include an appendix on generative grammar by Chomsky in his classic 
Biological Foundations of Language as early as 1967. 
 Or, as Chomsky framed it at the Lenneberg symposium at around the same 
time — and on later occasions — the study of biolinguistics was concerned with 
standard questions about mechanisms, development, and evolution that any 
biologist would ask about a biological system: 
 
(1)  What is knowledge of language?  
(2)  How does language develop in the child? 
(3) How does language evolve in the species?  
 
Although these three questions can be studied in any order, or even in parallel, 
the better answers we have to question (1), i.e. have an understanding of the 
mechanisms and structure of the language faculty, the better we can answer 
question (2), how these mechanisms and structure unfold in the child — and, as 
recent work on evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo) has shown, the 
better we understand the answers to questions (1) and (2), the better equipped 
we are to study what Harnad above called the “target” of language evolution. 
For example, recursion is one the important syntactic mechanisms available to 
the language faculty. This insight from theoretical linguistics in turn opened the 
cross-species investigation of recursion in other species (as, for example, in 
tamarins and starlings). 
 As another example, at a conference on Maturational Factors in Cognitive 
Development and the Biology of Language held in 1978, there is a discussion between 
Chomsky and the neurologist Norman Geschwind about a number of questions 
concerning evolution of language; among others, about the cerebral asymmetries 
in the great apes, auditory tasks in the left temporal lobe of the monkey, 
asymmetry for emotional behavior in the brain, the recognition of species-specific 
cries in the left hemisphere of Japanese monkeys, male-female differences in left-
right asymmetry for areas involved in bird song, and so on. (For the full 
exchange, see Jenkins 2000.) This interchange provides a flavor of the discussions 
taking place among linguists and neurologists at the time. In any case, this does 
not seem to be the behavior of someone out to pose a “virtual ban” on the topic 
of evolution.  
 Kenneally tends to sprinkle her factual reporting with unsupported 
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generalizations: “For example, scientists assumed for a long time that the parts of 
the brain that have to do with language must be wholly new, recently evolved 
additions that we do not share with nonhumans”. In asserting this, she totally 
overlooks a whole generation of work on brain and language; one looks in vain 
for any mention of Geschwind and Galaburda’s work on cerebral dominance and 
asymmetry (e.g. Geschwind & Galaburda 1986) or LeMay and Geschwind’s work 
on the morphological asymmetries of the brains and skulls of nonhuman 
primates (e.g. LeMay & Geschwind 1975), to mention only a few examples. Nor 
was work on evolution of lateralization limited to the language areas; consider, 
for example, the work by Denenberg and colleagues on functional asymmetries 
in the rat (e.g. Denenberg 1981) as well as the numerous asymmetries in lower 
organisms documented by Corballis and Morgan (e.g. Corballis & Morgan 1978; 
Morgan & Corballis 1978).  
 In 1998, when Gannon and colleagues reported their findings of an 
asymmetry in the left planum temporale area of chimpanzee brains (Gannon et al. 
1998), this was heralded in the press as “challenging cherished notions of how 
language evolved in humans and why apes cannot talk” (New York Times). 
However, left-right asymmetries in non-human primates, including the planum 
temporale area, had been long known (see e.g. Cunningham 1892, Fischer 1921, 
Yeni–Komshian & Benson 1976). The German magazine Der Spiegel claimed that 
until the study of Gannon et al., it had been thought that the left and right sides of 
the brains of non-human primates were absolutely equal, although this had been 
shown twenty years earlier not to be the case by the study of Beheim–
Schwarzbach (1975), who had compared the temporal regions in humans, 
chimpanzee, and the orangutan. 
 Moreover, in 1979, the Linguistics Society of America held its first Summer 
Institute abroad at the Joint Linguistic Society of America and University of 
Salzburg Summer Linguistics Institute at the University of Salzburg, Austria with 
the theme of Linguistics and Biology, which included courses, seminars, and other 
presentations as well as discussions on linguistics and biology of language, 
including neurology and the evolution of language. Although many scholars 
from Europe and around the world attended this Linguistics Institute, no 
mention was made of the “virtual ban” that had supposedly been imposed by 
Chomsky. Also around this time there were many fruitful contacts between the 
ethologist and evolutionary biologist Konrad Lorenz and his colleagues in 
Austria and at the Max Planck Institute in Germany, and generative linguists at 
the universities of Vienna and Salzburg. In 1976, Lorenz and his colleagues 
participated in a symposium on language and biology at the Salzburg Summer 
School of Linguistics (apparently in violation of the “ban”).  
 Much is made by Kenneally of a paper by Pinker and Bloom, in which the 
central thesis is: “In one sense our goal is terribly boring […]. All we argue is that 
[…] the only way to explain the origins of such abilities [such as language, vision, 
etc. — LJ] is through the theory of natural selection” (Pinker & Bloom 1990). 
However, the idea that natural selection and adaptation play a role in language 
evolution was hardly controversial long before the Pinker and Bloom paper. In 
fact, the application of these standard biological ideas may be seen in the popular 
writings of the biologists and Nobel Laureates Monod, Jacob, and Luria in the 
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early 1970s in their discussion of the ideas of Chomskyan generative grammar. In 
fact, Kenneally notes: “He [Chomsky — LJ] reiterated that there were factors in 
evolution other than natural selection, which were as likely to be significant. And 
in this regard, Chomsky, Pinker and Bloom were essentially in agreement, their 
debate arising more from differing emphases than actual discord”. So the reader 
is left scratching his or her head as to what the fuss is all about, and why people 
make such fantastical claims, such as that Chomsky believes that language is not 
a product of evolution (Plotkin 1998) or that he is trying to enforce a ban on 
language evolution studies.  
 Kenneally (p. 200) states that after the discovery of the language effects of 
FOXP2, “the possibilities (were hailed) for a new science” and that it was called 
“neurogenetics” by Vargha–Khadem and her colleagues (who worked on the 
phenotype of the FOXP2 system; cf. Vargha–Khadem 1995). However, the field of 
neurogenetics has been around a lot longer than since 2001, and its scope is 
considerably broader than language, referring to the genetics of the nervous 
system in general. For example, nearly 30 years ago, Xandra Breakefield edited a 
volume on the subject. This collection also included an article by Kenneth K. 
Kidd & Mary Ann Records entitled ‘Genetic methodologies for the study of 
speech’ (Kidd & Records 1979). Although the term was even in use much earlier 
than this, this shows that the genetics of language was understood to be a 
subfield of the much broader field of neurogenetics. In addition, the Journal of 
Neurogenetics launched its first issue in 1983. 
 Kenneally notes that “it’s been pointed out that the rules of phonology 
contradict Chomsky’s notion of the poverty of stimulus — the idea that there is 
not enough information in the language a child hears for it to learn language” (p. 
155). However, the work cited only argues that certain data from phonology 
don’t require appeal to poverty of stimulus. Moreover, poverty of stimulus 
doesn’t require that all language data be part of man’s genetic endowment. 
Clearly, then you would not be able to explain how an infant born in a Japanese-
speaking environment,but moved at birth to an English-speaking environment 
comes to learn English. It has always been understood that language learning 
requires a complex interplay between internal and environmental factors. So, for 
example, to argue that poverty of stimulus is superfluous, you would have to 
show that the phenomena explained by it; e.g., structure-dependence of syntactic 
rules such as question inversion in English can be derived from the data available 
to the child. There have been serious efforts to do this, e.g. Pullum & Scholz 
(2002). However, Legate & Yang (2002) examined the child language corpus used 
and showed that this particular attempt failed. Even if the attempt had 
succeeded, one would still have to go on to provide an alternative explanation for 
all of the numerous phenomena that have been discovered over the years and 
explained by poverty of stimulus (island conditions and others) to rule it out. In 
fact, however, researchers in biolinguistics now accept that there is a genetic 
endowment underlying the language faculty. Most research has long since 
shifted to other questions such as what is genetically specified and what 
environmental input is required, and whether this genetic endowment is in part 
or in whole domain-specific or not, or even species-specific or not. 
 In fact, an alternative picture to Kenneally’s ‘linguistics wars’ view of the 
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study of language evolution is that biolinguistics has moved gradually through 
several phases in recent decades, corresponding to the questions posed earlier 
about (1) knowledge of language, (2) acquisition of language, and (3) evolution of 
language. The first phase was primarily concerned with the construction of 
generative grammars that represented the knowledge of language (language 
faculty). The second phase extended the findings across many languages and 
attempted to account for both the universal properties of language as well as 
their variation (e.g., in the Principles–and–Parameters model). The third phase, 
building on the results of the first two phases, is increasingly concerned with 
questions of function, design, and evolution (e.g., the Minimalist Program).  
 Kenneally cites the famous maxim of Dobzhansky (1964) that “nothing in 
biology makes sense except in the light of evolution”. Modern work on evolution 
(‘evo-devo’) has turned that maxim on its ear, as Pennisi (2002) has noted, so that 
one might say that higher stages of evolution make no sense except in light of 
(developmental) biology. Accordingly, if we want to understand the evolution of 
language, we must also understand the (developmental) mechanisms underlying 
one of evolution’s magnificent achievements, the human language faculty. 
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